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Medical Law and the Power of Life and Death 
 
Kenneth Veitch∗ 
School of Law, University of Sussex, UK 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to offer an analysis of the nature of contemporary 
legal power over the ending of human life in medical contexts. Drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s characterisations of power relations in the sphere of life and death in 
The History of Sexuality – Vol. I, it is argued that, in its current regulation of the 
ending of human life in this area, law displays elements of two of those modes, or 
forms, of power identified by Foucault – the juridical and the disciplinary. This 
argument is illustrated by reference to two recent cases – Re A (Children) and Re 
B (an adult: refusal of medical treatment) – and set against a background of 
shifting modes of governmentality (here, the movement from medicalisation to 
legalisation). Through an analysis of the forms of legal power in this particular 
context, the article also has a broader purpose – to advance an alternative 
approach to the question of power within the academic medical law field. 
Specifically, unlike the standard form of legal academic inquiry in this area – that 
is, one which is driven mainly by a concern for ethics and resolving ethical 
dilemmas – it is suggested that an appreciation of the importance that 
institutional context(s) and requirements play in medical law is necessary if we 
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are to understand fully both the factors constitutive of legal power and the subtle, 
and often controversial, effects that flow from the manner in which it is exercised 
and asserted. 
I Introduction 
For a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to 
decide life and death. (Foucault, 1978: 135) 
Deciding disputed matters of life and death is surely and pre-eminently a matter for a 
court of law to judge. (Re A (Children), per Ward LJ)
1
 
The uptake of Michel Foucault’s work on power in the social sciences has mainly 
been concerned with his notion of bio-power. Whether focussing on the 
disciplinary or bio-political sub-sets of bio-power, it has been what Foucault said 
about the power exercised over human life – how to manipulate it, monitor it, and 
make it more useful to the community – that has caught the attention of many 
social scientists.2 While interesting, this concern is far from surprising. As the 
above quotation implies, Foucault considered the power to make decisions about 
the existence or destruction of human life an ancient right that no longer reflected 
the fact that it was life, and not death, around which modern power relations 
revolved. 
In this article, I want to resurrect, and focus on, this question of the relationship 
between power and death. In particular, I seek to assess the usefulness of 
Foucault’s characterisations of power relations – both his notion of the juridical or 
‘sovereign power’ and his idea of bio-power – for thinking through the relationship 
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between contemporary legal power and questions about the ending of human life 
in medical contexts. In other words, I want to ask if Foucault’s analyses of power, 
including those that concerned themselves with identifying the mechanisms 
through which societies sought to produce more useful human life, can assist us 
in understanding the manner in which contemporary law manages death in 
disputes arising in the field of medical practice. I will suggest that they can. 
To date, the analysis of the nature of law’s increasing power over the existence 
of human life in the medical context has tended to adopt a particular form. The 
guiding logic or mode of analysis of much of the academic literature on legal 
regulation, not only in this sphere but also across what may be described as the 
medical law field generally, is driven by a concern for ethics and ethical 
principles.3 The form of inquiry usually undertaken seeks both to establish the 
degree to which the law recognises and implements various ethical values – 
human rights and autonomy are often marked out as particular favourites – and, 
to the extent that it fails to do so, to call for reform of the offending legal approach 
or practice.4 While this type of analysis is by no means devoid of usefulness, 
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implicit in it is a tendency to equate legal power with the degree to which it 
implements, or arrives at, ‘correct’ resolutions of ethical dilemmas. In the current 
context, at least, this tendency obscures from view the different types of power at 
work in the legal regulation of the existence of human life. Specifically, it fails to 
note and, therefore, to explain how certain institutional exigencies and practices 
within the common law shape the development and expression of those various 
modes of power. The source of legal power in this area is often not the ethical 
reasoning of judges; rather, it can be located in the more mundane practices and 
traditional techniques of common law reasoning. Thus, what follows is an attempt 
to expand the range of vantage points from which to reflect on, and understand, 
the nature of contemporary law’s increasing involvement in regulating, or 
managing, the boundaries of human life in medical contexts. By doing so, I hope 
that some of the less obvious, but by no means less important, factors 
constitutive of that involvement can be brought into focus. It is my argument that 
Foucault’s work on power is a useful resource by which to conduct such an 
inquiry.5 
While this study of the different types of legal power over the ending of human life 
forms the central focus of the article, this specific topic is indicative of a broader 
transformation that has been occurring over the last few decades – that is, the 
increasing role of law in managing various issues and conflicts arising in the field 
of medical practice. Consequently, it will be useful to preface the substantive 
analysis of the article with a brief discussion of the possible reasons behind this 
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transformation. In section two, and in a very preliminary manner, I will suggest 
that what we are, and have been, witnessing is what Dingwall and Hobson-West 
have described as: ‘the substitution of legalisation for medicalisation as the 
paramount mode of governmentality.’ (Dingwall and Hobson-West, 2006: 41) I 
will argue that their analysis provides a convenient framework within which the 
substantive topic of this article is capable of being understood. In the third 
section, I will outline part of Michel Foucault’s genealogical inquiries into power, 
and, more specifically, his characterisation of the changing nature of power 
relations over life and death. Thereafter, and by way of an analysis of two recent 
cases in the English courts, I seek to demonstrate how Foucault’s notions of the 
juridical and bio-power can assist in identifying some of the characteristics of 
contemporary legal power over the existence of human life in medical contexts.6 
Despite the differences in the precise forms and modes of operation of power 
found to exist in each case, it is argued that the manner in which law asserts its 
power and function in both cases − stressing the objectivity and neutrality of the 
common law’s practices − is similar. This legal assertion of power and function is, 
in itself, an important instance of power in that it works to obscure from view the 
often controversial consequences of the manner in which legal power is 
exercised in this area. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that, in order to grasp the 
type of hidden institutional power dimensions identified in this article, academic 
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human life in medical contexts. 
 6 
medical law must seek to expand the range of analytical tools which it currently 
deploys to explain and understand its object of research. 
II SHIFTING MODES OF GOVERNMENTALITY: FROM 
MEDICALISATION TO LEGALISATION 
How can we account for the emerging involvement of law in a number of issues 
and problems which, had they arisen in the past, would have fallen to be 
discussed and resolved within the province of medicine? Why, as Ward LJ’s 
words above confirm, is law increasingly coming to be viewed as the preferred 
mechanism through which to settle disputes arising in the domain of medical 
practice? More broadly, what are the conditions responsible for this apparent shift 
in authority from medicine to law in contemporary Western societies? While it is 
impossible to address those questions adequately in this article, I do want to 
begin to think through the wider processes that may be responsible for the more 
frequent recourse to law in this area that we are witnessing today. Drawing on 
the work of Dingwall and Hobson-West in the field medical sociology, I will 
suggest that their identification of a shift from medicalisation to legalisation in 
contemporary Western societies provides, in general terms, a useful framework 
within which to comprehend the specific examples discussed in this article. 
Mitchell Dean has observed that: 
The capacity to manipulate our mere biological life, rather than simply to govern 
aspects of forms of life, implies a bio-politics that contests how and when we use these 
technologies and for what purposes. It also implies a redrawing of the relations 
between life and death, and a new ‘thanato-politics’, a new politics of death. (Dean, 
2004: 16) 
Two points can be noted from this observation. First, human beings’ increasing 
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ability to manipulate their biological functions has consequences for traditional 
notions of health and illness, and of life and death. Technological developments 
in medicine and the life sciences – such as the invention of the mechanical 
ventilator or respirator in the 1950s and the potential medical applications of 
research in molecular biology, especially in the field of human genetics – have 
had, and no doubt will continue to have, the effect of transforming social and 
cultural perceptions of what it means, for example, to have a life.7 But, crucially, 
and this is the second point, those developments are also sources of conflict. The 
enhanced capacity to sustain human life and to manipulate its fundamental 
components results in questions concerning, and disputes over, the extent to 
which medical practice ought to deploy those capabilities in particular cases. The 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from patients in a permanent 
vegetative state8; the question of whether to provide ventilation to seriously ill 
babies9; the diagnosis and selection of embryos for the purpose of creating 
healthy human beings10 – all these examples illustrate the conflict surrounding 
the existence of human life that can ensue from the application of technological 
developments in the field of medical practice. 
Dean’s use of the word ‘politics’ (in both its ‘bio’ and ‘thanato’ formulations) is 
therefore useful as it accurately captures the contestation and conflict produced 
as a result of the ever growing technological ways in which human life can be 
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manipulated. But while such developments clearly contribute to the creation of 
the types of conflict which courts increasingly tend to arbitrate, they do not 
sufficiently explain why law is coming to be seen as the preferred institution 
through which the issues and conflicts arising in the domain of medical practice 
are to be managed and regulated. In order to address this question, I will draw on 
an essay by Robert Dingwall and Pru Hobson-West. (Dingwall and Hobson-West, 
2006) 
Dingwall and Hobson-West argue that the challenge to medicine today can best 
be understood as part of a broader shift from medicalisation to legalisation – that 
is, a shift in the mode of governmentality. They define this latter term as relating 
to ‘the interlocking systems of values and institutions constitutive of the ordering 
of a society.’ (2006: 41) Consequently, what we are witnessing today is not 
merely a challenge by law to medicine in the narrow sense, for example, of the 
courts regulating aspects of doctors’ practices or procedures; more 
fundamentally, a shift in the values and institutions underpinning the very manner 
in which authority is exercised and society ordered is underway. Viewed in this 
light, ‘The fundamental challenge to medicine is not from law but from the 
governmentality that favours law as its operative strategy.’ (2006: 57) 
This ‘governmentality that favours law as its operative strategy’ – that is, 
legalisation – reflects a society in which the individual and his or her particular 
interests, rights, and agreements constitute the definitive values. Personal 
autonomy and self-reliance become the guiding principles of social organisation 
and Dingwall and Hobson-West argue that this state of human relations is ripe for 
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‘the colonial aspirations of law’ because: ‘Law casts human beings as self-
sufficient individuals, intentional actors and guardians of their own interests.’ 
(2006: 54) The consequence of this is that not only does law come to be treated 
as the preferred means by which to settle disputes and seek redress of one’s 
grievances; but, in the very process of acting in such a capacity, the institution of 
law plays a crucial role in reinforcing and perpetuating the type of social 
organisation that calls it into play in the first place. In other words, rather than 
simply being used as the most obvious location for the expression of individuals’ 
rights and interests, law’s burgeoning authority means that it plays an integral 
role in constructing and maintaining the social order of which it is a part. 
Medicalisation, on the other hand, and at least after the creation of the National 
Health Service in the UK in 1948, was one aspect of a different mode of 
governmentality – that is, one which ‘reache[d] out to embrace the population in a 
moral community, a holistic vision of a welfare society.’ (2006: 55) This was the 
era of social medicine which, amongst other things, was defined by the 
importance of community and the protection of the less fortunate members of 
society (in this case, the sick). The coincidence of those values with the broader 
ethos of the welfare state meant that medicine and medical professionals 
occupied a central and authoritative role in the overall ordering of society. Thus, 
according to Dingwall and Hobson-West, it would be incorrect to conceive of 
medicalisation as an attempt by medical professionals to colonise various areas 
and aspects of social life; rather, it is to be better thought of ‘as one aspect of the 
governmentality of social democracy where ‘the imperfections of the market 
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are…tempered by measures of social reform based on the values of an 
enlightened bourgeoisie’.’ (2006: 53, reference omitted) 
Dingwall and Hobson-West point to several examples in the medical field which 
underline the displacement of medicalisation by legalisation in contemporary 
Western societies. Increasing resort to litigation for the purpose of seeking 
individual redress of one’s grievances; the erosion of trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship; the willingness to challenge medical professionals’ opinions; the 
contractualisation of health care services – all are indicative of the decline of 
medicalisation as the dominant mode of governmentality and the corresponding 
emergence of legalisation in its place.11 The institution of law therefore comes to 
play a central role in managing the uncertainty and disorder produced by the 
retreat of medicalisation. In doing so, however, it also contributes to the 
maintenance of a new type of social order and organisation (a new mode of 
governmentality) – one defined by self-reliance and the assertion of individual 
rights and interests. 
Dingwall and Hobson-West’s characterisation of the relationship between 
medicine and law as one concerning a more fundamental shift in the mode of 
governmentality in contemporary Western societies provides a loose, but useful, 
framework within which to understand both the more prominent role of law in 
managing disputes arising from medical practice and the specific examples 
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flowing from this, see, for example: Wacquant (1999) & (2001), and Bauman (2005). 
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discussed in this article. Their analysis, however, does not, and cannot, tell us 
much about the specific nature of law’s power over the ending of human life in 
medical contexts. In order to study this, I will draw on some aspects of the work 
of that writer who originally advanced the idea of ‘governmentality’ – Michel 
Foucault.12 
III Foucault and ‘The Right of Death and Power over Life’ 
In the final Part of The History of Sexuality Volume 1 – ‘Right of Death and Power 
over Life’ – Foucault traces the nature of the transition from a juridical form of 
power relations to one he describes as bio-power (Foucault, 1978: 133-59). The 
former was embodied in the sovereign whose privilege it was to decide on the 
existence of human life. This privilege, which Foucault says was ‘in reality the 
right to take life or let live’, could be thought of as specific to a particular type of 
historical society where power took the form of repression, and where seizure of, 
inter alia, life itself was the ultimate form of suppression (1978: 136. Emphasis in 
original). Moreover: ‘[The] symbol [of this ‘right’]…was the sword.’ (1978: 136) 
Significantly, in such a society, the sovereign’s right of death existed for the sole 
purpose of protecting and, therefore, sustaining his own life. 
It is important to note that, even though the sovereign often deployed this right of 
force through the law, Foucault does not equate the notion of the juridical with 
law. Rather, it refers to a specific arrangement of power relations – one that he 
describes as ‘deductive’. This top-down form of power relations manifests itself in 
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various ways. Thus, as well as the seizure of life, it is intimately bound up with 
the prevention of certain acts and the permission of others. A specific threshold 
of individual conduct is established in advance and the freedom to act or not is 
determined by reference to this. Conduct which transgresses the threshold is 
prohibited; that which does not, is permitted. As Victor Tadros comments: 
‘Juridical power operated by defining a threshold between two fields of activity. 
Either one had crossed the threshold or one hadn’t.’ (Tadros, 1998: 89) While not 
the sole prerogative of the legal field, historically the law played a significant role 
in defining the appropriate threshold beyond which certain acts were to be 
punished. Finally, it is important to stress that it is no part of Foucault’s argument 
that the juridical notion of power relations no longer exists in modern societies; he 
simply believes that it no longer accurately reflects the main form of power 
relations in such societies – namely, bio-power. 
According to Foucault, bio-power signalled a transformation in the ‘mechanisms 
of power’. Since the classical age,13 it is no longer the juridical form of power 
characteristic of the sovereign’s right of life and death (either to destroy life or to 
allow it to continue) that predominates; rather, a multitude of forms of power 
comes into existence whose purpose is to shape, administer, and control human 
life in all its various manifestations. Life becomes something to be managed and 
directed, as opposed to simply allowed or ended. It is this positive, productive 
control of life, and not the right to kill (death), that defines the nature of bio-power. 
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And yet, as Foucault points out, this sustenance and shaping of life is not 
accompanied by the disappearance of killing; indeed, quite the contrary. What 
does alter, however, are the justifications for the exercise of the ‘power of death’. 
In the age of bio-power, killing is not carried out in order to protect the life of the 
sovereign but, rather, all lives – that is, the life of the population. In other words, 
the ‘power of death’ becomes directly linked to the central objective of bio-power 
− namely, ‘the biological existence of a population.’ Foucault succinctly sums up 
the nature of the transformation in power relations as follows: ‘One might say that 
the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or 
disallow it to the point of death.’ (Foucault, 1978: 138) 
Bio-power took two different, but related, forms. 14  The first was known as 
disciplinary power. Its focus was the body. The purpose was to discipline this so 
that its utility could be maximised and its functional capabilities tailored to, and 
incorporated within, ‘systems of efficient and economic controls’ (1978: 139). In 
contrast to what Foucault calls ‘penal law’ – which was a type of juridical power 
that was administered in the course of judicial practice – disciplinary power was a 
‘nonjudicial power’, exercised by various bodies, including medical, 
psychological, and psychiatric institutions (Foucault, 2001: especially 52-89). 
Characteristic of this form of power was the ‘examination’ – a process of 
supervision of individuals by, inter alia, doctors and psychiatrists that produced 
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became ‘the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of 
the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.’ Foucault (1978: 139) 
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knowledge about those individuals: 
A knowledge that now was no longer about determining whether or not something had 
occurred; rather, it was about whether an individual was behaving as he should, in 
accordance with the rule or not…This new knowledge was no longer organized around 
the questions: “Was this done? Who did it?”…[I]t was organized around the norm, in 
terms of what was normal or not, correct or not, in terms of what one must do or not 
do.
15
 (Foucault, 2001: 59) 
In other words, rather than establishing whether individuals’ specific acts had 
contravened rigid rules, it was who these individuals were and how they might act 
in the future that formed the focal points of investigation in disciplinary society. 
The activity of defining thresholds gives way to the imposition of implicit norms of 
behaviour, character, and attitude that may or may not be met by the individual. 
Rather than transgressing such norms, individuals will live up to them, or fail to 
do so, to varying degrees. The purpose of these various institutions was to ‘train’ 
the sick, the mentally infirm, and the criminals so that their future habitual actions 
would conform, or approximate as closely as possible, to ‘society’s’ expected 
norms of behaviour. Tadros usefully identifies the crux of the difference between 
the juridical and bio-power in the following way: ‘Power is not only preventative 
[the juridical], it is also creative [bio-power] or as Foucault would put it, it is not 
only deductive, it is also productive.’ (Tadros, 1998: 77-8) 
Despite his statement that disciplinary power was a ‘nonjudicial power’, Foucault 
nevertheless envisaged consequences for law of the transformation in the 
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He continues: ‘Psychological knowledge of the individual was constituted around the pole of 
abnormality…This psychology sought to establish itself by claiming its ability to deal with the 
problems posed for social apparatuses by dysfunctional conduct.’ (1985: 5) 
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concept of power relations from the juridical to bio-power. Given their importance 
in the current context, it is worth quoting his reflections at length: 
Another consequence of this development of bio-power was the growing importance 
assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law. 
Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; to those who 
transgress it, it replies, at least as a last resort, with that absolute menace. The law 
always refers to the sword. But a power whose task is to take charge of life needs 
continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing 
death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of 
value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, 
rather than display itself in its murderous splendor…I do not mean to say that the law 
fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather 
that the law operates more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is 
increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and 
so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. (Foucault, 1978: 144) 
Thus, for Foucault, the era of bio-power does not signal the irrelevance, or 
‘death’, of law; nor does it spell the end of law’s traditional association with the 
juridical notion of power relations. Rather, the point is that the law’s function 
partially adapts in order to align itself with the logic of power (measurement, 
appraisal, normalisation) characteristic of bio-power. It begins to perform a more 
positive, regulatory, and productive role, rather than remaining exclusively bound 
to its traditional deductive, juridical function. 
In what follows, I will try to demonstrate how Foucault’s two notions of power 
relations (the juridical and bio-power) offer useful tools by which to think through 
the function and power of contemporary law as manifested in two recent cases 
concerning the ending of human life in the medical context. 
IV Life, Death, and the Juridical Nature of Legal Power 
If there is a case that illustrates the juridical nature of contemporary legal power 
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in the area of life, death, and medical practice, then Re A (Children) is it.16 The 
judgment of Ward LJ in the Court of Appeal not only makes us aware of the self-
proclaimed privilege of law in managing contested questions surrounding the 
ending of human life; it also offers insights into the character of legal power that 
manifests itself in the course of such management. In this section, I will argue 
that aspects of Foucault’s analysis described above provide us with tools by 
which to comprehend an instance of law’s power over life and death. In doing so, 
however, I will suggest that it is death and his notion of the juridical – the two 
elements that Foucault envisaged as being of diminishing relevance in the age of 
bio-power – that are of most value here. Before that, though, it is necessary to 
set out, briefly, some of the background to the case and the manner in which 
Ward LJ arrived at his decision. 
Given the amount of discussion this case has engendered in both academic and 
non-academic circles, its facts are generally well known. Consequently, only a 
short summary of these – in the words of Ward LJ – is required: 
Jodie and Mary are conjoined twins. They each have their own brain, heart and lungs 
and other vital organs and they each have arms and legs. They are joined at the lower 
abdomen. Whilst not underplaying the surgical complexities, they can be successfully 
separated. But the operation will kill the weaker twin, Mary. That is because her lungs 
and heart are too deficient to oxygenate and pump blood through her body…She is 
alive only because a common artery enables her sister, who is stronger, to circulate life 
sustaining oxygenated blood for both of them…[I]f the operation does not take place, 
both will die within three to six months, or perhaps a little longer, because Jodie’s heart 
will eventually fail. The parents cannot bring themselves to consent to the operation. 
The twins are equal in their eyes and they cannot agree to kill one even to save the 
other. The doctors are convinced they can carry out the operation so as to give Jodie a 
life which will be worthwhile. So the hospital sought a declaration that the operation 
may be lawfully carried out. Johnson J. granted it…The parents applied to us for 
permission to appeal against his order [and] [w]e have given that permission.
17
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 Having set out the reason behind the need to involve the court – the clash of 
values between the twins’ parents and the hospital staff – Ward LJ transferred his 
attention to what he identified as the proper judicial function in the case: ‘This 
court is a court of law, not of morals, and our task has been to find, and our duty 
is then to apply the relevant principles of law to the situation before us – a 
situation which is quite unique.’18 
The ‘situation’ he talks about is that of the twins themselves and not the 
disagreement between their parents and the hospital staff. Accordingly, he was 
required to identify a relevant legal principle that could be applied to the twins’ 
‘unique’ situation. It was this – ‘the search for settled legal principle’ and its 
application to resolve the case – and not the ins and outs of moral philosophy 
and/or applied ethics, that Ward LJ had found ‘especially arduous’. 
In performing this function, he began by pointing out that, in cases involving 
children, the relevant legal principle was that of the welfare of the child and that 
this had to be the court’s paramount consideration (Children Act 1989, section 
1(1)). However, this particular case posed a problem for the application of the 
welfare principle as the nature of each twin’s interests differed and, consequently, 
could not both be made paramount.19 This lack of an applicable legal principle 
did not mean, however, that the Court would simply be unable to resolve the 
case. Significantly, Ward LJ said that the Court had to make a decision; 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
essays in Sheldon and Wilkinson (2001). 
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 [2000] 4 All ER 961, at 969. 
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 The interests of the stronger twin (Jodie) would best be served by proceeding with the 
operation to separate her from her sister (Mary), while the interests of Mary would best be served 
by not operating and allowing her life to continue, albeit for a short period of time. 
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otherwise, ‘[It] would be a total abdication of the duty which is imposed on us.’20 
His ‘search for settled legal principle’ ended in the judgments of Kennedy LJ and 
Evans LJ at the Court of Appeal stage in Birmingham City Council v H (A 
Minor).21 Referring to their judgments, Ward LJ said: ‘I can see no other way of 
dealing with [the conflict of duty] than by choosing the lesser of the two evils and 
so finding the least detrimental alternative. A balance has to be struck somehow 
and I cannot flinch from undertaking that evaluation, horrendously difficult though 
it is.’22 
But how was the legal principle of the least detrimental alternative to be 
measured and to what conflict, exactly, was it to be applied to resolve? 
Focussing solely upon the circumstances of the twins, Ward LJ set himself an 
‘analytical problem’ that involved weighing what he identified as being the 
respective interests of the twins and ‘[doing] what is best for them’.23 An example 
of this process can be seen in the judge’s approach to the twins’ differing 
physical attributes. Thus, in contrast to Jodie, who is portrayed as strong and 
having the potential to engage in life, Mary’s condition means that, whatever 
action is taken, she is ‘doomed for death’. The manner in which Ward LJ 
summarises the physical characteristics of the twins leaves little room for debate 
in establishing the least detrimental alternative: ‘[The weaker] sucks the lifeblood 
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 [2000] 4 All ER 961, at 1010. 
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out of [the stronger]…If [the stronger twin] could speak, she would surely protest, 
“Stop it, Mary, you’re killing me”. Mary would have no answer to that.’24 After 
placing several other factors in the scales, the judge arrived at his ‘actual balance 
sheet of advantage and disadvantage’, concluding that: ‘The best interests of the 
twins is to give the chance of life to the child whose actual bodily condition is 
capable of accepting the chance to her advantage even if that has to be at the 
cost of the sacrifice of the life which is so unnaturally supported.’25 This, in Ward 
LJ’s view, was the least detrimental alternative. Consequently, the operation was 
deemed to be lawful and subsequently performed. 
In several ways, Re A (Children) can be thought of as the ‘juridical’ medical law 
case par excellence. First, and at the most basic and obvious level, it displays an 
instance of contemporary law’s privilege ‘to take life or let live’. The sovereign 
power claimed for the law by Ward LJ to decide ‘disputed matters of life and 
death’ necessarily incorporates that sovereign, juridical power which Foucault 
terms ‘the right to decide life and death’.26 The Court of Appeal clearly wields its 
sword (its ‘right of death’) by sanctioning the death of the weaker twin at the 
hands of the surgeon’s knife. At a purely physical level, then, the law perfectly 
conforms to the defining characteristics of juridical power – it is a vertically 
applied (deductive) power that sanctions the suppression, or seizure, of life itself. 
To put it in Foucault’s rather colourful language, it is an example of a power that 
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disputed matters of life and death…’. 
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‘display[s] itself in its murderous splendor…’ (Foucault, 1978: 144). 
Of course, it might be objected that this is not the type of scenario that Foucault 
was referring to when describing the nature of juridical power over life and death, 
especially as the right of death in the present context was exercised for the 
purpose of saving another’s life. It can be distinguished, one might argue, from 
the case Foucault had in mind, where the sovereign sends his subjects to their 
deaths in order to protect his own existence. After all, is not the justification for 
death in the present context admirable – not the protection of the judges’ own 
lives, but that of another who will be capable of engaging in a full and healthy 
life? Is it not more akin to the justification Foucault identifies for the persistence of 
killing in the age of bio-power – i.e. that it occurs in order to protect life generally? 
Perhaps; but I want to suggest that this more utilitarian interpretation of the 
Court’s decision misses an important aspect of the case that is, contrary to the 
possible objections just outlined, capable of being explained by way of the notion 
of juridical power. 
This second ‘juridical’ aspect of the case can be described as follows: the right of 
death is exercised in order to protect what might loosely be referred to as the ‘life’ 
of the law.27 In other words, while there is clearly no question of the judges’ lives 
being at risk, their failure to exercise the right of death might endanger the law 
itself, and, in particular, the contemporary sovereign function claimed by Ward LJ 
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 For a similar type of point in the medical law context, see Diamantides (1995), in which 
Diamantides argues that the judiciary’s ascription of interests to an insensate Anthony Bland in 
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for courts of law (‘deciding disputed matters of life and death’). One can begin to 
explain this by recognising what is at stake for Ward LJ in Re A (Children). From 
the foregoing discussion of the case, it is clear that what bothered him was 
making clear the point that the common law, and especially its established 
institutional practices, must, at all costs, be defended against the potential threat 
posed by the ‘hard’ nature of the case. The temptations to slip into moral 
discourse and deliberation, to be seduced by sympathy for the parents’ 
predicament and views, or to refuse to make a decision at all, needed to be 
resisted stubbornly by re-emphasising some central tenets of common law 
reasoning. Thus, the overriding judicial function was to discover, in the canon of 
the common law, the relevant legal principles that could be applied to resolve the 
case and to produce the correct legal answer: 
They [cases where providing or withholding medical treatment is a matter of life and 
death for the incompetent patient] are always anxious decisions to make but they are 
invariably eventually made with the conviction that there is only one right answer and 
that the court has given it.
28
 
This emphasis on resolving the situation, on arriving at an answer, was a crucial 
factor in the case. As we saw earlier, Ward LJ couched this institutional exigency 
in terms not only of right, but of judicial duty too. The judiciary could not, for lack 
of a relevant legal principle, simply refuse to make a decision; in order to meet its 
responsibilities, it had to find the relevant legal principle, apply it to the 
circumstances of the case, make a decision, and, one might add, be seen to do 
so. 
In concrete terms, this need to sustain the institutional practices and exigencies 
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of the common law (the ‘life’ of the law) led to the exercise of the law’s right of 
death in the following way. Having eventually discovered the relevant legal 
principle (the least detrimental alternative), the responsibility of the Court was to 
apply that principle to resolve what it took to be the situation before it. The 
clearest way in which this duty could be accomplished was by constructing a 
‘conflict’ between the twins themselves in which their respective interests and 
characteristics would be presented in a polarised fashion (weak/strong, 
capable/not capable of engaging in life). The resolution of the ‘conflict’ – involving 
the death of the weaker twin – through application of ‘the least detrimental 
alternative’ principle would therefore appear almost a foregone conclusion. In 
other words, in this case the sustainability of the claim that the common law, and 
its practices, offer the most appropriate means by which a society can decide 
contested issues of life and death depended on the Court being seen to resolve a 
conflict successfully; the most effective way it could do this was by exercising its 
right of death. 
The third and final ‘juridical’ aspect of the case once again concerns the idea of 
suppression. Here though, the power exercised by the Court results in different 
forms of suppression. On the one hand, it directly negates, or overtly suppresses, 
the views of the twins’ parents and prohibits their proposed course of action. Like 
the taking of the weaker twin’s life, one witnesses a deductive form of power at 
work here. On the other hand, I will argue that more tacit instances of 
suppression can be identified. While these examples of suppression are 
obviously less clearly identifiable from the judgments than the negation of the 
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parents’ views, they nevertheless still involve suppression or prevention. For that 
reason, they offer a further example of the juridical form of power present in the 
case. In respect of both forms of suppression, I will seek to demonstrate that the 
conditions of their existence lie predominantly in the institutional practices and 
exigencies of the common law. 
The first ‘suppressive’ feature relates to the views expressed by the twins’ 
parents. They had been unable to consent to the operation necessary to 
separate the twins mainly for the following reason: 
“We cannot begin to accept or contemplate that one of our children should die to 
enable the other to survive……Everyone has the right to life so why should we kill one 
of our daughters to enable the other to survive……We have faith in God and are quite 
happy for God’s will to decide what happens to our two young daughters.”
29
 
While Ward LJ took care to describe the parents’ views at length, his following 
conclusion on these illustrated the unequivocal power of law in cases of life and 
death: 
In my judgment, parents who are placed on the horns of such a terrible dilemma simply 
have to choose the lesser of their inevitable loss. If a family at the gates of a 
concentration camp were told they might free one of their children but if no choice were 
made both would die, compassionate parents with equal love for their twins would elect 
to save the stronger and see the weak one destined for death pass through the gates.
30
 
One interpretation of this statement would be to see it as a Manichaeistic 
depiction of the nature of parents’ possible responses to the reality confronting 
the twins’ parents in this case. By suggesting that there can only exist one 
possible course of action, Ward LJ divides parents’ responses into two ‘moral’ 
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camps – the first being those who are ‘compassionate’ parents and would feel 
compelled to save the stronger twin; the second (those who would do nothing), 
by implication, being the morally impoverished group who lack compassion. This 
polarisation of what is to be expected of parents in such circumstances is a 
perfect illustration of what Pierre Bourdieu has called ‘the universalization effect’ 
in the ‘juridical field’ (a field that includes judges): ‘The universalization effect is 
created by a group of convergent procedures:…[including] reference to 
transsubjective values presupposing the existence of an ethical consensus (for 
example, “acting as a responsible parent”)…’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 820. Emphasis in 
original)31 Ward LJ uses the moral qualities of ‘compassion’ and ‘love’ to suggest 
that there exists a moral consensus on the course of action that parents would 
take in such circumstances. By definition, the views and beliefs of those parents 
who would not save the stronger twin are to be negated and their characters 
conjured up as morally aberrant. Thus, given that the parents’ chosen course of 
action in this case is alien to the moral perspective of the judge (and, for the 
purposes of the legal case, the moral perspective of what one might call ‘the 
reasonable parent’), it is simply negated. In keeping with a juridical notion of 
power relations, their proposed course of action, one might say, transgresses the 
moral threshold of conduct defined by the judge and must, as a consequence, be 
prohibited. 
However, to confine the explanation of this negation to the level of the purely 
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moral, fails to take account of how the judge’s words sit in, and indeed are a 
product of, the institutional context within which they are uttered. Discussing the 
same quotation, Scott Veitch has argued that: 
The two objective, universalised, values or norms – Ward LJ’s and the parents’ – may 
conflict in an incommensurable way – that is, in such a way that to make them 
commensurable would fundamentally misunderstand and destroy the meaning and 
practice of one of them – yet, and this is the key point, the legal institution cannot 
countenance incommensurables. Its decisionistic imperative and its social priority impel 
it to commensurate, and for this reason the law cannot truly countenance, cannot bear, 
the tragedy thrown up by the situation. It must resolve it, and this is the particular force 
of law. (Veitch, 2006. My emphasis) 
In other words, as a simple moral conflict, the clash of values arising from the 
parents’ views and those of Ward LJ is irresolvable without negating the meaning 
of either, or even both, views. However, given the particular context within which 
the conflict exists, it cannot be left to fester. As we saw earlier in relation to the 
law’s exercise of its ‘right of death’, in order to satisfy the common law’s need for 
finality, a decision must be made. But rather than speak of ‘resolution’, there is 
just plain suppression of the parents’ views and values. Indeed, the unwillingness 
of the Court to focus on trying to resolve the original conflict before it – that 
between the parents and the medical staff – results in the need to create an 
artificial conflict (between the twins themselves) capable of resolution by the 
application of legal principle (the least detrimental alternative). The difficulty of 
applying this principle to the parents’ views (their religious views meant there was 
no alternative, far less a least detrimental one, open to them), means that these 
must simply be negated. In order for the judiciary to do its work properly, and 
uphold a central tenet of common law reasoning, some sort of imbalance in the 
circumstances before the Court must exist (a ‘lesser of their inevitable loss’) to 
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which the legal principle can concretely be applied to resolve. As such, the 
intransigent moral reasoning behind the parents’ views had to be met not merely 
by counter-moral argument, but by the unequivocal, juridical power of the law. 
What one witnesses here, then, is a clear effect of the juridical power of the 
common law. The parents’ views and proposed course of action are not only fully 
set out by the judge; they are manifestly suppressed too. Suppression, here, 
equates to prevention or inhibition. But this tangible suppression of their views 
and wishes has, concomitantly, a further suppressive effect, which is less 
obvious in character, and relates to more general issues that the case can be 
thought to touch upon. Thus, fundamental questions such as: What is the nature 
of parenthood?; Is this really a matter for the State and, if it is not, to what extent 
should the State be allowed to interfere in the private lives of citizens?; Should 
the State be able to ride roughshod over parents’ religious beliefs?, are 
conspicuous by their absence from the judges’ opinions.32 The disagreement, 
conflict, and debate inherent in such issues never surface in the Court of Appeal. 
Instead, they are suppressed, but this time tacitly. What we are dealing with here 
is suppression in the sense of ‘keeping secret’ or ‘refraining from mentioning’ 
something that ought to be revealed or that may be understood from the context. 
In other words, while those broader questions may be thought to be integral to 
the nature of the case, no space is provided in the course of the hearing for the 
debate and disagreements they engender to be played out. 
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It should be pointed out that this suppression of those central underlying issues 
does not mean that decisions are not being made about them; they clearly are. It 
simply means that those decisions are obscured from view by the emphasis that 
is placed on legal precedent and the need to search for, and identify, the 
appropriate legal principle to be applied to the ‘conflict’ between the twins. 
Indeed, it might be thought that the precise effectiveness of this technique of 
common law reasoning in the case lies in its ability to render invisible, and 
therefore immune to criticism, the fact of the Court’s involvement in making 
controversial decisions about fundamental issues over which there is legitimate 
disagreement, but without that disagreement being played out in the legal forum. 
Furthermore, whatever the broader reasons for the increasing invocation of law 
as a means of settling disputes about life and death arising in the field of medical 
practice, the very naturalness of law’s appropriation of those disputes, and their 
consequent subjection to techniques and exigencies of common law reasoning 
that are held out as being objective and neutral, makes it much less likely that 
this appropriation and subjection, and their consequences, will attract debate or 
criticism.33 This is because courts of law would appear to be the self-evident 
social arbiters of such sensitive disputes. Their practices and the expertise of 
their personnel in matters of dispute resolution lend an unquestioned air of 
legitimacy to Ward LJ’s authoritative claim to legal power over life and death. 
One of the consequences of this state of affairs is that academic criticism of legal 
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power in this area tends to take the form of squabbling over the specifics of 
particular judicial rulings and their outcomes. The unquestioned assumption 
about the legal appropriation of disputes concerning life and death deflects 
critical attention away from the wider question of the appropriateness of 
subjecting those disputes to the practices and techniques of common law 
reasoning in the first place. Perhaps more than any others, then, it is those 
instances of tacit suppression – especially the ability of the common law to 
operate in such a way as to suppress, or prevent, the possibility of criticism 
before it is even realised that there is something to be criticised – that most 
clearly define the extensive reach of law’s juridical power over life and death in 
this case. Of course, the sanctioning of the weaker twin’s death and the 
prevention of the parents’ proposed course of action offer up clear and particular 
instances of the consequences of the law’s sword. But it is this less obvious, but 
by no means less significant, power of tacit suppression, and the specific 
institutional conditions of its existence (the operation of the common law’s 
practices and reasoning techniques) that ought also to be both noted and give 
rise to questions regarding Ward LJ’s sweeping claims to judicial sovereignty 
over contested issues of life and death. 
Let me now draw together the main strands of the foregoing discussion. First, far 
from being of diminishing relevance today, I have argued that Foucault’s notion of 
the juridical is alive and well, at least in that area of medical law concerned with 
disputes over the ending of human life. More specifically, in Re A (Children) it is 
possible to witness several juridical effects of the operation of contemporary legal 
 29 
power over life and death. Thus, not only do we see examples of the law’s 
deductive power (the exercise of its ‘right of death’ (its ‘seizure’ of life) and the 
direct negation of the parents’ views and wishes); we also encounter less obvious 
instances of suppression (the smothering of disagreement and conflict) that are, 
nevertheless, of great significance. Secondly, I have noted the conditions 
responsible for the production of those juridical effects in the ‘Twins’ case. These 
relate to the institutional practices and requirements of the common law, 
including the need to search for the correct legal principle to apply to the situation 
the Court defines as requiring resolution, and the judiciary’s obligation to arrive at 
a final answer, rather than refusing to decide the case at all. 
Finally, I noted how some of the less apparent juridical effects were masked by 
the ways in which law’s power was both asserted and functioned – that is, as an 
authoritative claim to sovereignty over disputes about life and death, and by 
means of objective modes of legal reasoning. These modes of assertion and 
functioning not only produce the ‘masking’ effect just described; they also 
undercut the likelihood of critical analysis, because they are assumed to be the 
natural mechanisms by means of which to settle disputes over life and death in 
the medical context. 
V Law, Discipline, and Productive Power 
In this section, I seek to demonstrate how contemporary legal power over the 
existence of human life in the medical context can be interpreted as disciplinary – 
that is, as exhibiting one aspect of Foucault’s bio-power. In order to do so, I will 
take as my focal point the recent case of Re B (an adult: refusal of medical 
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treatment).34 But while I will argue that it is possible to differentiate the ways in 
which legal power operates in Re A (Children) and Re B, I also want to 
emphasise the similar way in which the court’s function is asserted in both cases. 
In other words, despite the existence of a different mode of operation of power 
(disciplinary power) in Re B, the High Court’s assertion of its function as a neutral 
arbiter that, by stressing the need to focus on technical legal tests and precedent, 
makes no ‘value’ judgment on the course of action proposed by the woman at the 
centre of the case – Ms B – exhibits close parallels with Ward LJ’s approach to 
legal reasoning in Re A (Children). 
The case arose out of the unwillingness of clinicians caring for Ms B – who had 
become a tetraplegic as a result of a haemorrhage of the spinal column in her 
neck – to comply with her request not to be kept alive by means of artificial 
ventilation. This unwillingness did not arise because Ms B was found to lack the 
requisite mental capacity to make a decision to refuse medical treatment – 
indeed, it was decided that she did have such a capacity; rather, the clinicians’ 
refusal to comply with her wishes stemmed from the fact that what they were 
being asked to do contravened one of the central tenets of their professional 
practice – that is, to strive to maintain human life. In these circumstances, Ms B 
sought the intervention of the High Court. Specifically, she asked the Court to 
declare that she did, indeed, have the necessary mental capacity to refuse 
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medical treatment, and that the maintenance of the artificial ventilation 
constituted a trespass to her person. The Court held that she had the requisite 
mental capacity described and that the NHS hospital trust concerned had acted 
unlawfully by failing to resolve the dispute over Ms B’s predicament expeditiously. 
The objective of the common law test for mental capacity in such circumstances 
is to establish whether the patient has understood the nature, purpose, and 
effects of a proposed medical treatment.35 If this understanding is found to exist, 
then the patient is declared to have mental capacity and, in law, can exercise his 
or her right to self-determination by demanding that his or her wishes are carried 
out.36 The legal test for mental capacity itself is invariably held out by members of 
the judiciary as a technical or scientific procedure, with the necessary 
assessment that it entails often best performed by medical experts, especially 
psychologists and/or psychiatrists. Consequently, one of the test’s main benefits 
is thought to be its objectivity, which, in turn, allows courts to create the 
impression of legal neutrality. In other words, it allows members of the judiciary to 
declare that they are neither involved in making value judgments about patients’ 
proposed courses of action, nor in making explicit decisions about life and death. 
This, for example, is Butler-Sloss P’s summary of her judicial function in Re B: 
I shall…have to consider in some detail her ability to make decisions and in particular 
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the fundamental decision whether to require the removal of the artificial ventilation 
keeping her alive. It is important to underline that I am not asked directly to decide 
whether Ms B lives or dies but whether she, herself, is legally competent to make that 
decision.
37
  
The sole concern of the judge, then, is not to make a direct decision about life 
and death, but to establish Ms B’s mental ability to make a decision about 
medical treatment (to refuse it), the consequence of which will be death. 
Morgan and I have argued elsewhere that this attempt to create a division within 
the judicial function between assessing the patient’s mental capacity to make 
decisions regarding medical treatment (a proper role for courts) and assessing 
the nature of the patient’s decision (effectively, a decision to die – an 
inappropriate function of the court) is untenable. (Morgan and Veitch, 2004: 116-
20) The thrust of our reasoning for this contention is that the nature of patients’ 
decisions is a pre-requisite for the existence of tests for mental capacity. In Re B, 
for example, the only reason that an assessment of Ms B’s mental capacity was 
necessary was because the consequence of her proposed course of action 
would be death. Unlike the unquestioning acceptance which would have followed 
a decision that complied with the clinicians’ wish to maintain ventilation, her 
actual decision had to be investigated in some detail. This meant that the Court 
necessarily became directly involved in questions of life and death. Its ultimate 
finding that Ms B did, indeed, possess the mental capacity to make the decision 
she had already made could not be anything but intimately bound up with the 
nature of her decision – one that revolved around the central question of the 
continued existence of human life. In short, Re B provided a further instance of 
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the workings of contemporary legal power over life and death. 
The combination of the fundamental nature of Ms B’s decision and the focus 
upon the individual that the test for mental capacity demands, produced some 
revealing insights into just what types of factors the Court identified as crucial in 
making its decision about mental capacity, and, concomitantly, about the 
continued existence of human life. Again, Morgan and I have described these 
factors – which we identify as explanation, character, and imagination – in some 
detail. It is worth briefly saying something here, though, of what I take to be the 
most important feature relied on by the Court in arriving at its finding of mental 
capacity – namely, the question of character. 
Having answered the Court’s questions regarding the reasons for seeking to 
have the ventilator withdrawn, Ms B was then judged on the standard of her 
responses, the nature of her demeanour, and the quality of her character: 
Her wishes were clear and well-expressed. She had clearly done a considerable 
amount of investigation and was extremely well-informed about her condition.  She has 
retained a sense of humour and, despite her feelings of frustration and irritation which 
she expressed in her oral evidence, a considerable degree of insight into the problems 
caused to the hospital clinicians and nursing staff by her decision not to remain on 
artificial ventilation.  She is, in my judgment, an exceptionally impressive witness.  
Subject to the crucial evidence of the consultant psychiatrists, she appears to me to 
demonstrate a very high standard of mental competence, intelligence and ability.
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What one witnesses here is the type of inquiry that was really taking place during 
the Court’s application of its test for mental capacity. The factors to which weight 
is attached are not confined to those necessary to demonstrate, for example, that 
Ms B has weighed the treatment information she has been given, balancing risks 
and needs, in arriving at a choice (i.e. one of the requirements of the legal test for 
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mental capacity). Rather, the Court is also concerned with her demeanour, her 
character, and her attitude. Who is she, and how has she conducted herself 
throughout? Given the esteem in which the professional practice that she is 
seeking to confront and undercut is held, it is clear that she must not only explain 
her decision clearly but exhibit additional factors and traits that reach unspecified 
levels of character and attitude.39 The significance of this in the context of the 
case, however, is that the assessment of those traits impacts directly on the 
Court’s function of deciding whether or not to allow death. 
This latter observation acts as a convenient entry point to a broader discussion of 
the manner in which legal power can be thought to operate in Re B, and how that 
mode of power differs from that present in Re A (Children). Three points can be 
made here. The first is to note that, unlike Ward LJ’s suggestion in Re A 
(Children) that there was effectively some established threshold of moral conduct 
which the proposed action of the twins’ parents had transgressed, no such 
threshold of individual conduct is explicitly set out by the Court in Re B. Thus, Ms 
B’s proposed course of action is not simply permitted or prohibited by reference 
to a standard of individual conduct that is identified in advance by the Court; the 
threshold, if any, remains invisible and indeterminate. Consequently, and at least 
in this respect, we are not dealing, here, with a juridical legal power in Foucault’s 
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sense. Rather, it is suggested that what can be detected in Re B is a 
contemporary manifestation in law of certain aspects of his notion of bio-power, 
specifically its disciplinary component. This can be seen in the assessment of Ms 
B’s demeanour and attitude. Like Foucault’s description of the ‘examination’ 
outlined earlier, in the course of the hearing knowledge is acquired of Ms B’s 
character, amongst other things, and judgments made about this – specifically, 
the extent to which she has conformed to unspecified norms of behaviour that 
one might be entitled to expect of a person in her circumstances. The guiding 
questions are not, ‘“Was this done? Who did it”’, but, ‘Who are you? Has your 
behaviour and conduct conformed to certain norms?’ In keeping with Foucault’s 
observation that ‘the law operates more and more as a norm’ in the era of bio-
power, law’s power here manifests itself through testing, probing, measuring, and 
appraising, rather than ‘display[ing] itself in its murderous splendor’. Ms B must 
prove that she has acted responsibly and with a certain degree of control.40 
Secondly, and as I have already noted, Foucault’s notion of the disciplinary is 
intended to convey a productive, creative power. Its objective is to control and 
shape human life (specifically the human body) in order to inculcate certain 
standards of behaviour and levels of functioning. Thus, rather than death, bio-
power is squarely concerned with the development of useful human life. But as 
mentioned earlier, Foucault did not neglect the continued importance of death in 
the era of bio-power. He did, however, think that, rather than the direct taking of 
life associated with the juridical notion of power, bio-power could be described as 
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involving the disallowance of life to the point of death. While this phrase is 
somewhat cumbersome, what I simply wish to note from it is the clear distinction 
Foucault makes between a power that imposes death (the juridical) and one 
which – while bound up with producing death – does not directly impose it (bio-
power). I would argue that it is the presence of this latter type of power that one 
witnesses in Ms B’s case. Unlike the situation in Re A (Children), in Re B there is 
no clear taking or seizure of life – no direct imposition of death – to speak of. 
Rather, given the clinicians’ emphasis on the preservation of life, their reluctance 
to perform an act that would result in death, and the Court’s clear concern to 
respect those professional values, it is more useful to think of the case in terms of 
the allowance of death. Moreover, rather than taking centre stage, death lurks in 
the wings, kept firmly at arms’ length and, as much as possible, out of the legal 
discourse. Indeed, it might be said that death is produced, or allowed, by way of 
a focus on life. For example, the types of character traits emphasised by the 
Court – humour, insight, intelligence – are more in keeping with one fully 
engaged in life, rather than someone contemplating death. There is a sense in 
which the justification for death must be found to lie in the more recognisable and 
positive features of life. 
Finally, combining the foregoing points, it can be said that it is the knowledge 
acquired by the Court of who Ms B is, rather than any determination of whether 
her proposed course of action flouts a pre-constructed threshold of individual 
conduct, that forms the basis of how the Court manages its function of deciding 
this contested issue of life and death. Her ‘examination’ and the degree to which 
 37 
she is deemed to conform to unspecified norms of character and demeanour are 
directly relevant to the procedure by which the law allows death. 
Consequently, the use of Foucault’s work on life, death, and power in the current 
context can be read as a disturbance of his binary law-death-juridical and law-
life-disciplinary characterisation of power relations. In other words, what a case 
such as Re B illustrates is that, whatever the relevance of Foucault’s notion of 
disciplinary power to accounts of the role of law in the production of more useful 
human life, it is also useful in explaining one of the ways in which law manages a 
significant contemporary function – that is, the production of death in cases 
arising from the field of medical practice. 
If the manner in which power operates in Re B is disciplinary, the assertion of 
law’s power and function (by way of its focus on legal tests of mental capacity) as 
objective and neutral works to obscure this. As Tadros says: ‘Disciplinary power 
is ideally invisible in its application…[It]…attempts to cast light away from itself 
and onto the individual.’ (Tadros, 1998: 90) It is possible to see this process at 
work in Re B. The manner in which the Court sets up its function – to determine if 
Ms B has mental capacity – means that emphasis is, indeed, placed on the 
individual, in ways that can be thought to be both positive and neutral. In relation 
to the former, much is made of the importance attached by law in such cases to 
the autonomy of the individual – that is, her right to determine for herself whether 
to refuse medical treatment which is keeping her alive. Autonomy is invariably 
portrayed in the courts as one half of a polarised battle between itself and the 
sanctity of life principle. In the event of a contest between the two, it is settled law 
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that, at least in the case of adults deemed to have mental capacity, the former is 
always victorious. But, as we have already seen, the emphasis on the individual 
is also intended to be neutral and objective through the application of a test for 
mental capacity that is concerned solely with the state of the individual’s mind – 
especially her ability to understand and retain information about medical 
treatment, and to weigh that information in the balance when arriving at her 
choice. The objectivity that is held out as being inherent in this process is meant 
to prevent any judgmental reflection on the individual and her abilities. If mental 
capacity is found to exist, autonomy follows, and that is the end of the matter. It is 
also used as a mechanism by which the law seeks to distance itself from 
potential accusations that it is directly involved in making decisions about 
sensitive questions concerning the ending of human life. It needs the safety of a 
‘technical’ procedure that will allow it to assert its function as distinct from the one 
it is actually performing. Like the Court of Appeal in Re A (Children), then, in Re 
B there is an institutional need for the law to define its role in neutral and 
objective terms. 
As well as masking the existence of this disciplinary power, this assertion of the 
common law’s objective and neutral function has also had an effect on the 
general nature of critical analysis in this area, and I will now reflect upon this as 
part of my concluding comments. 
VI Conclusion 
There can be little doubt that the relatively new academic discipline of medical 
law has been heavily shaped by ethical discourse. Whether it be, for example, 
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autonomy, best interests, beneficence, or justice, academic medical lawyers 
have often deployed the tools and principles of ethical analysis as a means of 
reflecting on the state of their subject. This mode of analysis has, itself, been 
intimately bound up with the question of which set of professionals – the doctors 
or the lawyers – ought to have the authority to resolve sensitive dilemmas and 
disputes arising from medical practice.41 Generally, the argument has run along 
the following lines: As the ethical dilemmas arising from medical practice do not 
merely involve medical issues, why should medical professionals have the sole 
authority to decide how such dilemmas are to be resolved? As other factors – 
such as the wishes of patients – are integral to those dilemmas, there needs to 
be some method of ensuring that these non-medical aspects are both aired and 
duly protected. The best way of doing this is to engage the assistance of law – 
specifically the courts – as members of the judiciary are experts in dispute 
resolution, pride themselves on their impartial approach, and have a tradition of 
upholding rights. 
With the greater involvement of law in the resolution of such disputes, critical 
analysis has shifted to analysing the extent to which the courts are moving away 
from their traditional deference to the opinions and authority of the medical 
profession to exert their own authority in the form of upholding ethical principles 
such as the autonomy of patients. The focus partly becomes a quantitative one, 
in which the courts are urged increasingly to rely on, and implement, those types 
of principles – including autonomy and human rights – that pay due regard to the 
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non-medical features of dilemmas arising from medical practice. 
I would suggest, however, that this form of traditional critical analysis in the 
medical law field misses too much. For one thing, by exhorting law to intervene 
and claim authority over the growing number of issues and problems arising in 
the field of medical practice, it would seem to point to the need to explain law’s 
increasing role in this area in purely jurisdictional terms. While this is certainly an 
important and very useful way in which to reflect upon the emerging role of 
medical law – in both its judicial and academic guises42 – it fails to address the 
other possible forces (such as transformations in what Dingwall and Hobson-
West call the dominant mode of governmentality) behind the current tendency to 
view law as the most appropriate mechanism through which to settle our 
differences and conflicts. Thus, as well as acknowledging the significance of 
attempts made by law and lawyers to claim jurisdiction over traditionally medical 
issues, we must also try to account for law’s more prominent role in terms, for 
example, of wider sociological changes and developments. 
Secondly, by confining critical analysis of the law to the level of ethical discourse, 
and by placing faith in the ability of law to redress the apparent controversial 
exercise of medical power, the orthodox mode of critique in the medical law field 
fails to investigate the internal operation of legal power and the consequences 
that flow from that. In particular, its concentration on questions of ethics and 
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ethical principle means that the integral role of the more mundane practices and 
techniques of the common law in the constitution and expression of legal power 
in this area is never really recognised or addressed. Their very obviousness and 
familiarity work to obscure the significance of their role from view. By deploying 
aspects of Foucault’s work on power – specifically his notions of the juridical and 
the disciplinary – I have sought to offer a way in which these institutional 
mechanisms responsible for the subtle operation of power in one area of medical 
law can be grasped. So, for example, rather than concentrating on the ethical 
supportability or shortcomings of the outcome in Re A (Children), I found the 
main source of power in Ward LJ’s judgment to lie in his concern to uphold 
traditional techniques of common law reasoning. These techniques were 
fundamental to both the identification of the conflict to be resolved and the 
exclusion of more fundamental issues and questions the case could be thought 
to touch upon. Similarly, the High Court’s emphasis on the ‘technical’ legal test 
for mental capacity in Re B, helped to mask the controversial nature of the inquiry 
actually undertaken in the process of determining capacity. This demonstrates 
that the common law’s engagement with the individual in this area is not confined 
to defending the patient against medical power by giving him or her more 
autonomy; rather, on the route to a finding of patient autonomy, law’s power over 
the individual is more subtle and less uncontroversial than the rhetoric of patients’ 
rights would have us believe. 
With the increasing level of legal involvement in disputes arising from medical 
practice, there needs to be a more multi-faceted approach to power than 
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currently exists in the academic medical law literature. In particular, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that power in this area does not exclusively revolve 
around questions of ethics or the relative authority of the legal and medical 
professions. Rather, one must also note the less obvious sources of legal power 
– the apparently neutral and objective institutional practices of the common law – 
and the subtle, but often controversial, effects that these produce. 
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